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Users build up profiles online consisting of items that they have
shared or interacted with. In this work, we look at profiles that con-
sist of images. We address the issue of privacy-sensitive information
being automatically inferred from these user profiles, against users’
will and best interest. We introduce the concept of a privacy pivot,
which is a strategic change that users can make in their sharing
that will inhibit malicious profiling. Importantly, the pivot helps
put privacy control into the hands of the users. Further, it does not
require users to delete any of the existing images in their profiles,
nor does it require a radical change in their sharing intentions, i.e.,
what they would like to communicate with their profile. Previous
work has investigated adversarial images for privacy protection,
but has focused on individual images. Here, we move further to
study image sets comprising image profiles. We define a conceptual
formulation of the challenge of the privacy pivot in the form of an
“Anti-Profiling Model”. Within this model, we propose a basic pivot
solution that uses adversarial additions to effectively inhibit the
predictions of profilers using set-based image classification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online profiles often contain images, or consist mostly of images,
that users have uploaded or liked. Examples include profiles on
image-based social media such as Instagram, photo-sharing web-
sites such as Flickr, and dating apps such as Tinder. Users who create
such profiles are interested in sharing something about themselves
with other people. However, at the same time, they make them-
selves vulnerable to computer-vision-based profilers, which can
automatically infer personal information from images. Although
automatic profiling can contribute positively to the value offered by
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recommender systems, for example, by matching compatible people
on a dating site, some profilers are malicious. For example, the site
could reinforce the tendency of a person to fall into emotionally
abusive relationships. Currently, an increasing amount of research
has been carried out on developing profiling technology and rec-
ommender systems that protect privacy [1, 15, 17]. However, such
research requires users to fully trust the platform provider of the
services that they use. There is a lack of research that investigates
ways in which control over automatic inference can be placed back
into the hands of users.
Our paper addresses this lack by introducing the concept of
a privacy pivot for image-based profiles and proposing a basic
solution that demonstrates that the predictions of a state-of-the-
art classifier (used as a profiler) can be inhibited more easily than
might generally be assumed. Figure 1 illustrates the privacy pivot
concept. A user, Bob, is sharing images online and has accumulated
a profile. Bob becomes worried that his personality is being profiled
in ways that he does not approve of. Indeed, an automatic profiler
predicts that Bob has the personality trait of “Neuroticism” with
high confidence (Figure 1 bottom left). At a certain point of time
(the pivot point), Bob decides to start uploading photos that will
inhibit the profiler. Critically, he does not have the option to delete
any existing photos. Although the platform might offer the delete
option in the app, there is no guarantee that the existing images
are not still in the platform database or somewhere else online. At
the pivot point, Bob continues sharing images, but now is doing
so strategically to avoid profiling. His pivot is successful because
when the automatic profiler makes a prediction on the updated
profile (Figure 1 bottom right), it predicts “Neuroticism” with low
confidence (i.e., Bob is classified as negative for this personality
trait). In this work, we focus on personality, but the idea of pivoting
image-based profiles toward privacy is transferable to any personal
or privacy-sensitive information.
The main goal of the paper is to provide a framework that will
allow computer vision researchers to be able to tackle the challenge
of privacy pivot for image-based profiles. The framework, i.e., our
“Anti-Profiling Model”, is formulated as an adversary model such
as used in research on adversarial images. In addition to the Anti-
Profiling Model, we present a basic pivot based on adversarial
addition as a proof of concept.1
Currently, adversarial techniques are being used to protect image
privacy, but they are limited to inhibiting inference carried out on
individual images [21, 30]. Profiler algorithms do not, however,
operate on individual images, but rather they are so-called image-
set classifiers, which take as input a set of images. In this paper, we
1Code for our basic pivot (adversarial addition) andmore detailed experimental analysis
available at https://github.com/liuzrcc/Image-Set-Profile-Pivot
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Profile-based prediction on Bob: 
     Neuroticism (High chance)f({…})





Existing profile (original image set) Profile continuation (adversarial addition set)
{ A}
Post-pivot profile-based prediction on Bob: 
     Neuroticism (Low chance)f({…} ∪ {…}A)
Bob: "Acceptable."
Figure 1: Bob’s existing profile leads the automatic profiler to predict Neuroticism (High chance). Bob pivots by continuing his
profile using our adversarial addition, achieving a profiling prediction he finds more desirable.
move beyond protecting individual images to lay the ground work
for research on protecting entire image-based profiles.
In Section 2, we cover relevant related work. Then, we intro-
duce our “Anti-Profiling Model” in Section 3. Next, in Section 4,
we propose a basic adversarial addition pivot and demonstrate its
effectiveness at pivoting profiles. We close with a conclusion and
outlook in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Profiling on Social Media
Machine learning-based approaches have achieved striking suc-
cess in mining personal information from the accumulated data
of user profiles. Here, we mention some key examples. Chaabane
et al. [5] show that it is possible to predict private attributes only
based on that data that a user reveals, e.g., music that the user has
“liked”. Further, Kosinski et al. [10] show that easily accessible digi-
tal records on the web, e.g., Facebook likes, can be used to predict
several private attributes, including religious, personality traits, and
gender. Segalin et al. [27] propose a deep learning-based method to
predict users’ personality traits using only image content. Sertkan
et al. [29] explore the possibility of modeling a touristic profile
from a selection of a user’s pictures based on an aggregated image
representation achieved by convolutional neural networks. Han
et al. [8] demonstrate that the age and gender of users on Insta-
gram are still identifiable when tags and image content that directly
reflects age and gender are excluded. Some private attributes can
also be predicted by machine learning through an ego network [13].
Narayanan et al. [18] show that an anonymous online author has
other recognizable idiosyncrasies. Although we focus on image
profiles here, privacy pivots could be developed for a wide range of
cases, including profiles consisting of text or video posts.
2.2 Protecting User Privacy
The law is a major source of privacy protection, and research such
as [16] has studied the right to be forgotten that is included in Art.
17 of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
In Europe, users have the right to erase their personal data from
the service provider. However, they still must trust that the erasure
has taken place and also that their data was not copied elsewhere
online. For this reason, research, such as ours, which aims to pro-
vide users with direct control over their data, is important, along-
side of legal protections. Key examples of related research include:
TrackMeNot [19], which adds noise to obfuscate user search en-
gine interaction data, hiding users’ actual intention in many “ghost”
queries, and, BlurMe [33], which protects user rating profiles by
injecting ratings that inhibit inference of user gender. Computer
vision researchers have proposed several visual privacy protec-
tion methods against person-related recognition [20, 21, 23, 26, 30].
In the area of social images, the Pixel Privacy Task [12, 14] pro-
motes image privacy protection methods against malicious scene
inference. Privacy-sensitive attributes in images are discussed and
conceptualized in [22, 26]. Different from research on adversarial
images that prevents inference on individual images, our work
focuses on changing the prediction of a image-set classifier by con-
tinuing an existing profile, under the condition that images in the
existing profile may not be deleted.
3 ANTI-PROFILING MODEL
3.1 General Model
Privacy and security research makes use of models that provide the
specifications of attacks that must be countered. The starting point
is a general model consisting of a number of parameters, which
provides a framework summarizing the dimensions important for
the problem [25]. When proposing a specific solution, researchers
specify the settings of the parameters that they are adopting, using
motivations based on plausible real-world scenarios. They then
formulate their solutions within the model that is defined by the
specified settings. The quality of the research is judged both by the
motivation for the model settings that are adopted and also by the
ability of the solution to prevent attack.
Our point of departure is the observation, mentioned above, that
computer vision has potential to address the privacy pivot challenge
of image-based profiles if it can move beyond investigating individ-
ual images. Specifically, adversarial algorithms could be developed
that would allow highly effective pivots. The key piece that is miss-
ing before such work can be carried out is the general model that
defines how the challenge should be addressed. This model builds
on, but is considerably more complex than, single image models. In
this paper, we supply this key piece. Technically, this model is an
adversary model, since its goal is to inhibit the predictive ability of
the image-set classifier. However, we call the model Anti-Profiling
Model, since users trying to protect their privacy are not classic
adversaries, in the sense that they are not malicious. Our model
follows the general structure of adversary models from [25].
The Anti-Profiling Model is specified in Table 1. We describe and
motivate each dimension in turn. First, Output dimensions specify
properties of the pivoted profile. Output: Prediction describes the
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Table 1: Anti-Profiling Model: A framework specifying the dimensions relevant for pivoting profiles toward privacy.
Dimension Description Examples
Output: Prediction What is the desired behavior of the pivoted profilewith respect to prediction?
Target class should be predicted;
Target class should be avoided.
Output: Maintenance What characteristics of the profile should be main-tained?
Evidence of pivot appear should be {imperceptible | nonsuspicious} to the human eye;
Pivot should not disrupt what the user would like to share with other people (sharing
intention is maintained).
Input: Quantity What is the scope of the existing profile? A range specifying the number of images;
The resolution of the images.
Input: Quality What is the structure of the existing profile (in termsof the nature and distribution of the profile images)?
Few images provide clear evidence for the undesired class;
Most images homogenously provide {clear | indistinct} evidence for the undesired class.
Process: Knowledge
of profiler
How much does the pivoter know about the feature
extractor and the classifier used by the profiler?
Algorithms are known (white box);




How much does the pivoter know about the data used
to train the profiler (classifier and feature extractor)
Data is known and available (white box);
Something is known about the data (gray box);
Nothing (black box).
Process: Resources What the pivoter capable of doing? Computer vision expertise available to the pivoter;
Amount of computational power available.
Process: Strength of
pivot
What is the pivoter willing to change in order to
achieve the pivot?
Extent to which the sharing intention is adapted;
Number of images added.
desired adversarial impact of the pivot, i.e., the nature of misclassifi-
cation that the pivot should trigger. For example, a successful pivot
can be defined as one that classifies a profile into a specific class
(i.e., “Healthy”) or as one that classifies a profile as any class except
a specific class. These choices correspond to the targeted and un-
targeted cases used in the adversarial image literature [4]. Output:
Maintenance describes what should not be changed by the pivot. As
in the adversarial image literature, the adversarial transformation
should not touch the interpretation of the images, but rather should
be either imperceptible [32] or non-suspicious [3]. In the case of
a privacy pivot, maintenance applies to the continuation images,
since none of the images in the existing profile may be changed.
The privacy pivot also allows for a third category: the continuation
images can be consistent with specific desiderata, without needing
to be specific images. For example, users can pivot by continuing to
share images that reflect what they would like to share with others,
which we refer to as personal preferences, but which also lean toward
the target class. The option to focus on maintaining preferences
(sharing intention), rather than maintaining appearance of specific,
individual images, does not arise in research on single images.
Second, Input dimensions specify the nature of the content that
the pivot must operate upon. In the adversarial image literature,
there is little discussion of the full range of characteristics of pos-
sible input images. An example of an exception is [36], which dis-
cusses the difference between images containing large monochro-
matic areas and images containing textures. Moving from the single
image case to the privacy pivot case, it is no longer possible to gloss
over properties of the input. Rather, the existing profile must be
specified in terms of ranges that define the number of images it
can contain and the resolution of those images (Input: Quantity). It
must also be specified in terms of the nature of the images and the
distribution of those images (Input: Quality).
The Input: Quality dimension is challenging to specify because
it deals with how individual images are interpreted and how the
image interpretations come together into a profile interpretation.
However, it is important to think carefully about this dimension. A
given set of user profiles may bemore or less representative in terms
of quality of the full diversity of possible profiles. Without attention
to quality, vulnerabilities could be easily overlooked. Note that the
Input: Quality dimension is not narrowly concerned with the “good-
ness” of images, but rather encompasses broadly a characterization
of what images depict and how they are interpreted.
To make the Input: Quality dimension more concrete, we intro-
duce the notion of profile structure which we consider to arise from
the interaction of the nature of the profile images and their distri-
bution. We consider the nature of images to include their semantic
content, but also aspects such as style and aesthetics. Taking these
aspects into account, we see that there are different ways in which
images within the profile can be considered similar to each other.
We consider the distribution of the profile to be its level of homo-
geneity covering all the different possible aspects comprising the
nature of images.
We call special attention to the notion of profile clarity, which we
define as the degree to which the images in a user profile provide
clear evidence that the user falls into the category that the profiler
is attempting to infer (i.e., the inference that the pivoter would like
to inhibit, such as “Neuroticism” in Fig. 1). This notion of clarity
(vs. indistinctness) is important to consider when studying profile
privacy, alongside other aspects of images such as semantic content
and style, just mentioned. Note that the clarity can be seen as related
to individual images, but also to the profile as a whole (since taken
together the images provide a complete picture not reflected in
the sum of the individual parts). We define clarity in relationship
to human judgments of images, but we note that implications of
profile clarity for privacy violations will be related to the extent
to which the inference ability of a machine learning classifier is
related to human-perceived clarity. In Section 4 we explain how we
take a specific look at clarity in our experiments.
Third, Process dimensions specify the constraints on the process
of generating a pivot. They include classical dimensions related
to how much the pivoter knows about the profiler, both in terms
of the set-based image classification algorithm being used and in
269
UMAP ’21, June 21–25, 2021, Utrecht, Netherlands Zhuoran Liu, Zhengyu Zhao, Martha Larson
terms of the amount of expertise and resources available. Note that
it may be the case that a user who would like to pivot their profile
has access to a third-party service to help them. In this case, the
relevant resources are the resources available to that third party.
Process also includes Process: Strength of pivot, which captures what
the user is willing to change in order to accomplish the pivot. In the
adversarial image literature, the strength of the adversarial attack
is related to the bound on the distance that is allowed between the
original and the adversarial version of the image, in the case of
imperceptible adversarial transformations [7]. If the transformation
aims at non-suspiciousness, the strength will be specified by the
tolerance of users for certain transformations, and is measured by
a user study [2]. In the case of a privacy pivot, we need to also add
the number of images that the user is willing to add in the profile
continuation and also the degree to which the user might be willing
to stray (if at all) from posting images that correspond to their
underlying preferences (as defined by the Output: Maintenance).
3.2 Specific Model
Next, we describe the settings of the Anti-Profiling Model that we
choose to investigate in this paper. We propose a basic pivot based
on adversarial addition and experimentally test its effectiveness
in inhibiting the prediction performance of a profiler as a user
continues to extend their profile.
For Output: prediction, we target a specific class and for Output:
maintenance we do not specify that the profile extension contains
specific images, but rather that is consistent with the sharing inten-
tion (i.e., images are drawn from a preference set of images that the
user would have potentially posted). For Input: Quantity, we assume
that the existing profile contains 20 images and for Input: Quality
we assume the structure of the profile is uncertain (including the
nature of the images and the homogeneity of their distribution), but
that the data set that we are using is representative of a real-world
quality variation.
For Process: Knowledge of classifier, and Process: Knowledge of
data we assume no specific knowledge of the classifier other than
it is a personality classifier. The pivoter can make, however, a good
guess of how the classifier would classify their profile because they
are familiar with their own personality or are worried that their
profile is reflecting an undesired trait. We study the case in which
the pivoter has access to the same image representations as used
by the classifier, and also a case in which the pivoter has access to a
different set of representations learned on the same data set as used
to train the original classifier. Because we use assumptions about
the feature representations and the data used to train them, but no
information on the classifier, we consider these cases to be gray-box
and dark gray-box settings. Note that the data in question is Image-
Net data, which is widely available and can be considered currently
the default data set for such applications. Assuming ImageNet data
is used is therefore not a large leap. Also, in terms of Process: Knowl-
edge of data, we assume that the pivoter has the ability to label
data as being “extreme” cases of the target class. This assumption
is plausible because personality training data is labeled by human
annotators, who are not necessarily themselves experts. Process:
Resources we assume that the pivoter is or is being helped by some-
one with basic knowledge of computer vision. Process: Strength of
pivot we assume that the pivoter selects up to 20 images from a set
of images that represents their preference. (Note: we chose 20 since
it is the maximum reasonable given the resources of our data set.)
4 EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments test the ability of adversarial addition to pivot a
user profile. The underlying insight motivating adversarial addition
is that some of the users’ preferred images will be relatively closer
to the target value of the personality trait that the user wishes to
achieve. The profile will pivot away from the original, undesirable,
prediction if the user continues their profile with a selection of
these particular images. In this way, users can pursue their sharing
intentions while at the same time protecting their privacy.
We test adversarial addition against two profilers, one based on
Majority Voting (MV) [27] and one on state-of-the-art Weighted
Feature Fusion (WFF) [35]. Note that image-set classifiers that as-
sume that the image set consists of near duplicates or multiple
views are not well suited for social media profiling and do not come
into consideration for the state of the art. We use two profilers in
order to understand how the profiler interacts with the quality (na-
ture and distribution) of the image set that comprises the existing
profile. WFF uses a similarity model to calculate the contributions
of different images in the profile and then aggregates all images
with respect to the calculated weights. The threshold is selected
(using the validation set) for each profile length. WFF is able to deal
with cases in which a profile contains many low confidence images
that should not contribute to the decision.
4.1 Data and Evaluation
We perform our experiments on PsychoFlickr data set [28], which is
publicly available and widely used for image-based social profiling.
PsychoFlickr contains 200 “favored” images from each of 300 Flickr
users. Each user’s profile is labeled with the Big Five personality
traits in psychology: Openness to experience (O), Conscientiousness
(C), Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), and Neuroticism (N). For
each of these five traits, a profile is assigned a binary ground truth
label, which is referred to as “attributed trait”. The binary label is
determined by the magnitude of the scores averaged over all the
annotators (10 annotators per profile), which we call the “attributed
score”. Note that the data set also contains self-assessed traits, but
we do not use these here, because we assume the profiler does not
have access to self-assessment for training. We also point out that
the conclusions of our experiments are independent of our use of
the Big Five, i.e., another personality taxonomy could have been
chosen. We focus our work, however, on PsychoFlickr, because it
was the most suitable publicly available image data set representing
personal traits we could find.
We follow the same experimental protocol in [27] to build our
classifier (but note our focus is an image-set classifier and not an
image classifier). As in [27], our experimental data set is selected to
use users for whom the judgments are stronger, i.e., their attributed
scores are distributed in first and last quartile. Also, for each per-
sonality trait, we select two extreme users (users with highest and
lowest attributed score; ties broken using variance) and exclude
them from our data to be used for adversarial addition.
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Table 2: Prediction accuracy (%) averaged onfive personality traits (O, C, E, A, N) for user profiles, including original (20 images),
ordinary addition, and adversarial addition in both the gray-box and dark gray-box settings. The size (K) of each continuation
set is 6, 10, or 20 for both the Majority Voting (MV) and Weighted Feature Fusion (WFF) strategies. Results are reported for
total (weak/strong) user types (cf. Section 4.1). The “gray-box” denotes that VGG16 is used as feature extractor when ranking
images in the preference set, and “dark gray-box” denotes that AlexNet is used.
Fusion
Strategy Original
Ordinary addition Adversarial addition (gray-box) Adversarial addition (dark gray-box)
K = 6 K = 10 K = 20 K = 6 K = 10 K = 20 K = 6 K = 10 K = 20
MV 65.3 (59.4/71.2) 66.5 (60.2/72.8) 66.7 (59.2/74.2) 68.7 (62.0/75.4) 53.0 (49.8/56.2) 50.4 (47.6/53.2) 47.9 (47.8/48.0) 55.2 (51.0/59.4) 52.9 (51.6/54.2) 49.2 (47.8/50.6)
WFF 69.5 (64.0/75.0) 69.8 (63.2/76.4) 68.6 (61.0/76.2) 68.7 (61.8/75.6) 59.6 (55.0/64.2) 57.2 (52.6/61.8) 54.5 (48.4/60.6) 59.9 (54.2/65.6) 57.0 (49.8/64.2) 52.4 (48.2/56.6)
From the experimental data set, for each of the five personality
traits, we sample 20 users for validation and 20 users for the test
(in each case 10 positive and 10 negative for that dimension). The
remaining data in the experimental data set is designated training
data and is used to fine tune an VGG16 [31] image-level classifier
trained with ImageNet [6]. This is the best classifer in [27].
In order to evaluate the adversarial addition approach we require
test and validation user profiles associated with a preference set (i.e.,
images that fit the users’ sharing intention but were not included in
the existing profile). We create “sampled” users for this purpose by
sampling from our validation and test users. Recall that there are
200 images from each user. Our sampling process effectively cre-
ates multiple users from the original users. A sampled user profile
consists of 20 images sampled with replacement. This process gives
us 200 “sampled” validation users and 200 “sampled” test users.
For each “sampled” user, the images not sampled (i.e., the images
remaining from the initial 200) are taken to constitute that user’s
preference set.
We are interested in whether our basic pivot solution has the
same effectiveness across different types of profiles. The way in
which the ground truth was created gives us the opportunity to
look at differences in the level of clarity at which the evidence for a
personality trait is present in profile (related to the dimension Input:
Quality of our framework). We assume that this clarity is reflected
by the attributed scores assigned by the annotators: “strong” users
have higher scores and “weak” users have lower scores. For each
of the five personality traits, we separate our 200 “sampled” test
users in half based on the size of the attributed score of the user
from which they were sampled. In this way, we arrive at a subset of
100 weak “sampled” test users and one of 100 strong “sampled” test
users. Each of these subsets consists of 50 users who are positive
for the personality trait and 50 who are negative. Note that it would
be possible to create subsets of the test data in other ways as well.
We chose this approach, since it was straightforward and sufficient
to give us some initial insight in the type of variation of pivot-
effectiveness we might expect if the nature or distribution of the
input profiles changes.
4.2 Adversarial Addition
Given one user and a personality trait of this user (which can be
positive or negative), we first select the extreme image set (set of im-
ages from one of our previously reserved extreme users) associated
with the opposite polarity for that personality trait. We calculate
the Euclidean centroid of this extreme image set. Then, we select a
continuation set from the preference set of the user to be used as an
addition to the profile in order to accomplish the pivot. Specifically,
for all images in the preference set, we calculate the feature space
distance, sort in ascending order, and pick the top K samples that
are nearest to the opposite centroid as the adversarial continuation
set. As a comparison, we also construct an ordinary continuation
set by randomly sampling K images from that user’s preference set
without pivoting.
We test adversarial addition under two settings of the Anti-
Profiling Model. First, the gray-box setting, where the pivoter has
access to the exact feature extractor z that the profiler is using and,
second, the dark gray-box setting, where the pivoter has access to
a pre-trained ImageNet network, but not to the specific extractor.
We test adversarial addition against two different profiling clas-
sifiers, Majority Voting (MV) and Weighted Feature Fusion (WFF).
We have balanced test set for our experiments, so we use predic-
tion accuracy of profiler to show the effectiveness of adversarial
addition. For all user profiles, we report the average predicted user-
level accuracy. Specifically, for each “sampled” test user with 20
images in profile, we first calculate accuracy on original profile,
then we add continuation set consisting of 6, 10, and 20 images to
user profile and calculate accuracy again.
4.3 Experimental Results
Table 2 presents the average prediction accuracy for original user
profiles and profiles extended with continuation sets. “Ordinary
addition” shows that the accuracy of the profiler increases as users
continue to share images without pivoting. In contrast, our “Ad-
versarial addition” yields decrease of the accuracy, indicating the
effectiveness of our proposed pivot. For MV, even in the dark gray-
box setting the performance can be reduced below 50% (random
chance). We see that WFF is more robust, but the pivot is still highly
successful in reducing its accuracy in both the gray-box and dark
gray-box settings.
We can also see a clear contrast between the accuracy for the
strong and weak users (where weak/strong reflects the relative
strength of attributed scores cf. Section 4.1). This contrast shows
the importance of our Anti-Profiling Model. If we had ignored
the quality dimension, we would not have looked at profiles with
different characteristics and would not know that a WFF profiler
can be pivoted below 50% for weak users, but not for strong users
(without adding more than the 20 image continuation set, which is
the maximum size feasible given our data).
5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper introduces the challenge of privacy pivoting, which
has the goal of providing users with control of information that
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automatic profilers extract from their online image-based profiles.
We have shown that using a basic approach to pivoting profiles
that is based on adversarial addition (under which users continue
to share as they wish, but bend their activities toward a target class)
is surprisingly effective in inhibiting the prediction performance
of state-of-the-art automatic profilers. A key contribution of the
paper is the Anti-Profiling Model, which describes the aspects of
the problem that are essential to consider when developing privacy
pivots. We anticipate that this model will serve to promote work
on profile privacy, since it will allow researchers in the computer
vision community to understand the problem fully. Here, we have
provided only a proof of concept that shows the effectiveness of a
basic pivot. Future work will need to explore further to understand
the potential and the limitations of our basic pivot with respect
to other instantiations of the Anti-Profiling Model and to develop
more advanced pivoting approaches.
Future work will also need to investigate other image-set classi-
fiers. We point out that considerations of the nature of the images
differentiate the image-set classifiers relevant for this work from
the majority of existing image-set classifiers, which assume that
images in the set are near duplicates [24, 34, 37] or they assume
that there are 1-2 highly-suited images in the set that can be used
to make the classification and the others can be discarded [9, 11].
In the case of social media image profiles, these assumptions may
not hold. For example, the different images a user posts to their
dating profile are not usually multiple views of the same object.
We anticipate that the future will bring the development of new
image-set classifiers that are more suited to social media image
profiles, and if this happens, research into pivoting image profiles
towards privacy will need to keep up.
Moving forward, our Anti-Profiling Model can accommodate
other examples of Output: Prediction. Here, we have focused on
pivoting to the opposite prediction of a binary classifier. However,
in the future, pivots can also be designed to reduce confidence
or inhibit regression rather than classification. Also, the case of a
profiler attempting to predict a change in a personal attribute, such
as a shift in base mood, should also be addressed.
The “Anti-Profiling Model” that we have presented here includes
knowledge of the pivoter in the Process dimensions, but does not
include knowledge of the profiler. In the future, the model can be
extended to also describe the profiler, including, for instance, the
profiler’s training strategy, types of feature extractor/classifier, and
computational resources as well as the profiler’s knowledge of the
pivoter. Explicitly modeling these dimensions would contribute
to the development of stronger pivots. Note that specification of
the profiler’s knowledge of the pivoter, would help to understand
worst-case scenarios and also to support systematic emulation of
profilers in order to further enhance the protection strength.
Future research should keep in mind that studying profile piv-
ots needs careful analysis of the real-world conditions in which
pivoting is relevant. Specifically, research on adversarial image
profiles is not a straightforward extension of research on adver-
sarial images, but rather requires attention to differences that are
potentially important. For example, when studying adversarial im-
ages, adversarial training is often an obvious next step in order to
test the strength of the adversarial effect. However, in the case of
adversarial profiles, adversarial training may not be as important
since there is not necessarily a clear distinction between changes
in user profiles that occur due to pivots and changes that occur
due to other reasons. We hope that this paper allows researchers
working on adversarial images to understand how to expand from
their current focus on image-level classification and extend their
methods to set-based image classification.
We close by pointing out that we have formulated Anti-Profiling
Model in the context of pivoting image-based profiles. Future work
may build on the fact that it is actually equally applicable to other
profiles, such as text-based profiles. Further, it can be applied to the
problem of creating adversarial videos. Videos consist of frames,
meaning that video classification is essentially a set-based image
classification problem. Supporting users in protecting their online
profiles will require research into all the modalities in which users
share information.
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